### **CONFIDENTIAL** (Attachment Only)

| 1 | Request IR-22:  |
|---|---|
| 2 |   |
| 3 | Please provide a copy of the most recent annual financial update shared between the Plan's    |
| 4 | actuary and the union executive (see Eckler IR-1, p. 2).                                      |
| 5 |   |
| 6 | Response IR-22:   |
| 7 |   |
| 8 | The most recent annual financial update was provided to the union during meetings on March 22 |
| 9 | and 23, 2012. Please refer to Confidential Attachment 1.                                      |

### **NON-CONFIDENTIAL**

| 1  | Request IR-23:   |  |  |
|----|--|--|--|
| 2  |  |  |  |
| 3  | In the initial response to Eckler's IRs, there were several referrals to Eckler IR-14:           |  |  |
| 4  | • Eckler IR-1, p. 2, inferred that more detail around actions related to preparation for         |  |  |
| 5  | negotiations could be found by referring to IR-14;   |  |  |
| 6  | ■ Eckler IR-15 mentions comments made to NSPI's pension consultant and a submission              |  |  |
| 7  | to government regarding proposed changes to the Pension Benefits Act. There is then a            |  |  |
| 8  | referral to IR-14, presumably for more detail;   |  |  |
| 9  | ■ Eckler IR-17 asks about (pension) proposals in collective bargaining. The response is a        |  |  |
| 10 | referral to IR-14;   |  |  |
| 11 | ■ Eckler IR-21 asks about steps taken to reduce funding requirements. The response is a          |  |  |
| 12 | referral to IR-14.   |  |  |
| 13 |  |  |  |
| 14 | The response to Eckler IR-14 does not appear to contain any information or attachments in        |  |  |
| 15 | support of these referrals. Please confirm whether the initial response to IR-14 was             |  |  |
| 16 | complete. If the initial response was not complete, please provide the remainder of the          |  |  |
| 17 | response; if it was complete, please review your responses to IR-1, IR-15, IR-17, and IR-21,     |  |  |
| 18 | and revise as appropriate.   |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |
| 20 | Response IR-23:  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |
| 22 | All the referrals to Eckler IR-14 are in relation to the collective bargaining disclaimer at the |  |  |
| 23 | bottom of page 2. The responses to Eckler IR-1, Eckler IR-14, Eckler IR-15, Eckler IR-17, and    |  |  |
| 24 | Eckler IR-20 are complete.   |  |  |

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Request IR-24:

Please describe the alternative governance structures considered in preparing for negotiations with IBEW 1928 (see Eckler IR-1, p. 2).

Response IR-24:

The response to this Information Request is confidential.

### **NON-CONFIDENTIAL**

| 1  | Request IR-25:   |
|----|--|
| 2  |  |
| 3  | What changes to other large pension plans were reviewed in preparing for negotiations            |
| 4  | with IBEW 1928 (see Eckler IR-1, p. 2).  |
| 5  |  |
| 6  | Response IR-25:  |
| 7  |  |
| 8  | NS Power reviewed publically available information related to many pension plan changes. The     |
| 9  | pension plans reviewed included the Nova Scotia Public Sector, Nova Scotia Teachers, the         |
| 10 | Halifax Regional Municipality, the Nova Scotia Association of Health Organizations (NSAHO),      |
| 11 | Dalhousie University, and Air Canada.  |
| 12 |  |
| 13 | Please also refer to Eckler IR-26 Attachment 1 for details on a May 2012 benchmarking study      |
| 14 | involving a number of large regional and industry pension plans; this was an update to a similar |
| 15 | benchmarking study performed in 2010. The changes between 2010 and 2012 for the                  |
| 16 | benchmarked plans were also reviewed.  |
| 17 |  |
| 18 | The collective agreement between NS Power and the IBEW Local 1928 expired March 31, 2012.        |
| 19 | Negotiations for the new collective agreement commenced in March 2012 and there have been        |
| 20 | multiple meetings since then. Management and the union continue to meet in an effort to reach    |
| 21 | an agreement.  |

### **CONFIDENTIAL** (Attachment Only)

| 1 | Request IR-26:   |
|---|--|
| 2 |  |
| 3 | Please provide a copy of the updated benchmarking study comparing the NSPI plan to |
| 4 | other large Canadian plans, and identify the plans (see Eckler IR-1, p. 2).        |
| 5 |  |
| 6 | Response IR-26:  |
| 7 |  |
| 8 | Please refer to Confidential Attachment 1.   |

### NON-CONFIDENTIAL

| 1  | Request IR-27:   |
|----|--|
| 2  |  |
| 3  | Eckler IR-1, p. 3 indicates that the MPC oversees the plan's overall operation. Does the       |
| 4  | MPC decide on strategic direction for the plan? If not, who has this responsibility? Who       |
| 5  | decides the company's negotiating position related to pensions?                                |
| 6  |  |
| 7  | Response IR-27:  |
| 8  |  |
| 9  | Please refer to Eckler IR-29 Attachment 1.   |
| 10 |  |
| 11 | The ultimate responsibility for the oversight, management, and administration of the pension   |
| 12 | plan lies with the Board of Directors of NS Power. NS Power acts as both Sponsor and           |
| 13 | Administrator.   |
| 14 |  |
| 15 | As Sponsor, NS Power, through its Board of Directors, makes decisions which may arise from     |
| 16 | corporate considerations, including but not limited, to what benefits to provide, whether to   |
| 17 | terminate or continue a benefit program, and whether to change benefits as permitted by law.   |
| 18 | Sponsor duties are outlined in the Governance Framework.                                       |
| 19 |  |
| 20 | The Company's negotiating position on pensions is determined as part of the overall collective |
| 21 | bargaining strategy. The strategy is determined in conjunction with the executive management   |
| 22 | team, the negotiating committee and external consultants and is reviewed by the NS Power       |
| 23 | Management Resources and Compensation & Corporate Responsibility (MRCCR) Committee             |
| 24 | for alignment and approval.  |

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| 1  | Reque          | est IR-28:   |
|----|----------------|--|
| 2  |                |  |
| 3  | The S          | tatement of Investment Beliefs state that investment decisions must "                    |
| 4  |                | " and " (Ecker   |
| 5  | IR-2,          | Att. 5, p. 1).   |
| 6  |                |  |
| 7  | a)             | What are NSPI's financial tolerances?  |
| 8  | <b>b</b> )     | What would constitute an undue financial burden?   |
| 9  | c)             | Has NSPI tested their susceptibility to these tolerances under different economic        |
| 10 |                | scenarios?   |
| 11 | d)             | Are there scenarios under which NSPI believes its defined benefit plans to be            |
| 12 |                | unsustainable?   |
| 12 | Dagma          | maa ID 20.   |
| 13 | Kespo.         | nse IR-28:   |
| 14 | (a. <b>b</b> ) | Investment desicione and venella undentaliza by NC Device often the completion of an     |
| 15 | (a-b)          | Investment decisions are usually undertaken by NS Power after the completion of an       |
| 16 |                | asset liability study. The most recent study was conducted over the period 2010 to 2011  |
| 17 |                | and considered the potential outcomes over the next ten years. For purposes of this      |
| 18 |                | study, the key metrics to assess NS Power's financial tolerance were:                    |
| 19 |                |  |
| 20 |                | (i) expected cash funding;   |
| 21 |                | (ii) volatility in cash funding;   |
| 22 |                | (iii) expected pension expense;  |
| 23 |                | (iv) volatility of pension expense;  |
| 24 |                | (v) the Plan's going concern funded ratio; and   |
| 25 |                | (vi) the Plan's solvency funded ratio; and   |
| 26 |                | (vii) the Plan's accounting funded ratio.  |
| 27 |                |  |
| 28 |                | Given the seven metrics, there are seven different investment strategies, each of which  |
| 29 |                | would be optimal to satisfy a particular metric, but less than optimal for the other six |

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| 1  | metrics. For example, in order to minimize volatility of pension expense, a                             |
|----|---|
| 2  | predominately fixed income investment strategy would have to be adopted; however, this                  |
| 3  | would be expected to increase pension expense, cash funding, and reduce the Plan's                      |
| 4  | going concern funded ratio. Any investment strategy is a compromise between the seven                   |
| 5  | metrics with the goal of finding the best compromise.   |
| 6  |   |
| 7  | NS Power provided goals for each of the above metrics and reviewed the likelihood of                    |
| 8  | meeting the goals over the ten year study period under six potential asset mixes. As part               |
| 9  | of the study, 500 stochastic simulations were run for the ten year period of the study, for             |
| 10 | a total of 5,000 years of projections based on assumptions that were provided and                       |
| 11 | recommended by the consultant firm engaged to assist with the study. For each asset                     |
| 12 | mix, NS Power reviewed the range of outcomes, including the worst 5 percent of all                      |
| 13 | outcomes over the ten year period (outcomes for this one in twenty event can be                         |
| 14 | considered outliers and the use of the 5 <sup>th</sup> percentile is standard measurement in stochastic |
| 15 | studies). NS Power determined that the 5 <sup>th</sup> percentile of worst case outcomes would not      |
| 16 | constitute undue financial burden to NS Power. The 5 <sup>th</sup> percentile worst case outcomes       |
| 17 | under the actual asset mix at the time of the study, along with the most current financial              |
| 18 | figure (shown in brackets) are as follows:  |
| 19 |   |
| 20 | The pension expense figures shown in this response relate only to the amount attributable               |
| 21 | to the NS Power employees' registered pension plan. In the Application and support                      |
| 22 | materials, the term "pension expense" is more generally used to refer to the expense                    |
| 23 | attributable to all of NS Power's pension and post-employment benefit plans. The funded                 |
| 24 | ratios shown below are based on the plan's market value of assets.                                      |
| 25 |   |
| 26 | (i) annual cash funding: (projected \$60.5 million for 2013)  |
| 27 | (ii) annual change in cash funding requirements: (projected   |
| 28 | change between 2011 actual and 2012 actual)   |
| 29 | (iii) annual pension expense: (\$48 million included in 2013 GRA)                                       |

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| 1  |     | (iv)    | annual change in pension expense: (projected change  |
|----|-----|---------|--|
| 2  |     |         | between projected 2012 actual to 2013 GRA)   |
| 3  |     | (v)     | the Plan's going concern funded ratio: (actual   |
| 4  |     |         | 31, 2011)  |
| 5  |     | (vi)    | the Plan's solvency funded ratio: (actual at December 31,                                    |
| 6  |     |         | 2011)  |
| 7  |     | (vii)   | the Plan's accounting funded ratio: (actual at December 31,                                  |
| 8  |     |         | 2011)  |
| 9  |     |         |  |
| 10 |     | As the  | e study was being conducted, NS Power recognized that there were potential                   |
| 11 |     | outcor  | mes below the accepted tolerance that would cause financial stress in one or more            |
| 12 |     | of the  | metrics. As you can see from the above, some of the actual outcomes, primarily               |
| 13 |     | the ca  | sh requirements and solvency position, do fall below the 5 <sup>th</sup> percentile. For the |
| 14 |     | pensio  | on plan, the primary consideration in setting rates is the pension expense.                  |
| 15 |     |         |  |
| 16 |     | The co  | urrent financial situation is primarily due to the significant reduction in long-term        |
| 17 |     | interes | st rates during 2011 which affected virtually all pension plans. This has the most           |
| 18 |     | signifi | cant impact on accounting and solvency cash funding requirements. For defined                |
| 19 |     | benefi  | t pension plans, the low interest rates tends to impact the plan sponsor (higher             |
| 20 |     | contril | outions, higher pension expense), whereas for defined contribution pension plan,             |
| 21 |     | the lo  | w interest rates have a direct impact on employees (lower return on investments,             |
| 22 |     | delaye  | ed retirement) which may result in a longer-term impact on the plan sponsor                  |
| 23 |     | (succe  | ssion planning/workforce management as it relates to member's financial ability to           |
| 24 |     | retire) |  |
| 25 |     |         |  |
| 26 | (c) | As me   | entioned above, stochastic modelling (method of financial modeling in which one or           |
| 27 |     | more    | variables within the model are random; stochastic modeling is for the purpose of             |
| 28 |     | estima  | ting the probability of outcomes within a forecast to predict what conditions might          |
| 29 |     | be lik  | e under different situations) was performed to assess various future economic                |
|    |     |         |  |

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| 1  |     | scenarios with a total of 5,000 years modelled. Certain economic scenarios such as a       |
|----|-----|--|
| 2  |     | continuation of low and declining interest rates coupled with weak capital market          |
| 3  |     | performance have the potential to challenge the long term sustainability of the plan as    |
| 4  |     | measured by the key metrics.   |
| 5  |     |  |
| 6  | (d) | The potential worst outcomes for the pension plan could be referred to as black swan       |
| 7  |     | event (an event or occurrence that deviates beyond what is normally expected of a          |
| 8  |     | situation has a major impact, and that would be extremely difficult to predict).           |
| 9  |     |  |
| 10 |     | For NS Power, similar to other businesses, there are a number of potential black swan      |
| 11 |     | events. There are scenarios where the cost and expense of the defined benefit plan         |
| 12 |     | become very significant and unsustainable. NS Power management is aware of the             |
| 13 |     | pension plan costs and is considering various options to manage it. Please refer to Eckler |
| 14 |     | IR-11 Attachment 3, as well as Confidential Attachment 1.                                  |
| 15 |     |  |
| 16 |     | Financial management of the plan can come from changes to the pension plan terms.          |
| 17 |     | Any changes to the pension plan for union members must be made through the collective      |
| 18 |     | bargaining process. Please refer to Eckler IR-25.  |
| 19 |     |  |
| 20 |     | Please also refer to Eckler IR-19.   |
|    |     |  |

# **CONFIDENTIAL** (Attachment Only)

| 1 | Request IR-29:   |
|---|--|
| 2 |  |
| 3 | Please provide a copy of the Pension Governance Framework. (see Eckler IR-6, att. 1, p. 4) |
| 4 |  |
| 5 | Response IR-29:  |
| 6 |  |
| 7 | Please refer to Confidential Attachment 1.   |