# Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board

**IN THE MATTER OF** *The Public Utilities Act*, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380, as amended

-and-

**IN THE MATTER OF A PROCEEDING** Concerning Sales of Renewable Low Impact Electricity Generated within Nova Scotia by a Retail Seller to a Retail Customer pursuant to the Electricity Act (M06214)

# Renewable to Retail

Closing Submission

**February 12, 2016** 

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#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Nova Scotia Power (NS Power, the Company) has proposed a comprehensive framework to enable the purchase of renewable low-impact electricity generated within Nova Scotia from Licensed Retail Suppliers (LRS) to Retail Customers. The framework was developed after extensive consultation with stakeholders<sup>1</sup> and reflects the guiding principles set out in the Electricity Act (Act).<sup>2</sup> Those principles are succinctly summarized in the evidence of the Utility and Review Board's (UARB, Board) Consultant, Multeese Consulting Incorporated (Multeese):

The new tariffs and changes to existing tariffs being proposed in this proceeding are all required by legislation to facilitate the opening of the retail market to suppliers of renewable energy produced in Nova Scotia; i.e. to create the Renewable-to-Retail (RtR) market. They were developed with due recognition of the guiding principles specified in that legislation; namely, that **NS Power retains an obligation to serve, that the retail market opening should not negatively affect existing NS Power customers, and that the cost of opening the retail market should be borne by the participants in that market.<sup>3</sup>** 

[emphasis added]

The Company's framework is based on a disaggregated tariff model and includes a new Distribution Tariff (DT), new Energy Balancing Services (EBS) and Standby Service (SS) Tariffs that provide for back-up, top-up and spill services, and a RtR Market Transition Tariff (RTT) to recover embedded costs from the new licensed suppliers in accordance with Section 3G(2) of the Act. It is also comprised of an LRS Participation Agreement to establish the relationship between the LRS and Nova Scotia Power as well as terms, conditions and procedures applicable to the LRS and amendments to the Open

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, September 1, 2015, Section 3.1, pages 19-25 for a record of NS Power's stakeholder consultation process. See also Exhibit N-33, Evidence of Daymark Energy Advisors, page 11, lines 167-169, where Mr. Athas states on behalf of the SBA, "It is evident from the Application filed by NSPI that the stakeholder session influenced the ultimate content of their market design and tariffs."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Electricity Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 25, s. 3G (2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Exhibit N-31, Evidence of Multeese Consulting Inc. (Whalen), November 20, 2015, page 2, lines 9-15.

| 1  | Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), NS Power's Regulations, the Generator  |
|--|---|
| 2  | Interconnection Procedures (GIP) and the Wholesale Electricity Market Rules (Market   |
| 3  | Rules). The disaggregated tariff model was the model most preferred by the stakeholders   |
| 4  | who provided feedback and the model which was most clearly aligned with the principles  |
| 5  | in the Act.   |
| 6  |   |
| 7  | While acknowledging that some concerns have been raised about individual aspects of   |
| 8  | the Company's approach, NS Power is pleased that none of the participants has taken   |
| 9  | issue with its selection of this overall market design model. Mr. Athas confirmed his   |
| 10   | agreement with the model selected by the Company on behalf of the Small Business  |
| 11   | Advocate (SBA):   |
| 12   |   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | Within the stakeholder process NSPI presented and discussed various market options. These options distributed the burden, and thus costs, of understanding the market intricacies and the administrative effort differently among the participants, the customers, the LRS and NSPI. I feel that the chosen design allows an accurate renewable market to be established with clear pricing signals to the LSR for NSPI services and minimizes the burden on customers looking to 'just purchase cleaner energy'. <sup>4</sup> [emphasis added] |
| 23   | Indeed, NS Power notes that the framework proposed is supportive of market  |
| 24   | development in that the LRS is provided with a back-stop and there is no supply risk to   |
| 25   | departing customers as they are able to return to NS Power's bundled service.   |
| 26   |   |
| 27   | In this Closing Submission, NS Power will address concerns raised in the evidence by  |
| 28   | Intervenors and the Board's Consultants. The focus of much of the Intervenor evidence,  |
| 29   | particularly that of SWEB Development Inc. (SWEB) and Cape Breton Explorations  |
| 30   | (CBEX), has been on various aspects of the proposed tariffs and the mechanisms NS   |
| 31   | Power has incorporated to ensure there is no cost transfer from this new RtR market to  |

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NS Power's remaining customers.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Exhibit N-33, Evidence of Daymark Energy Advisors (Athas), November 20, 2015, page 15, lines 237-242.

 In assessing the Company's Application and the evidence given in this proceeding, consideration must be given to both the obligations of NS Power within this new market and the principles of the Act. The participants who enter this new market will have access to NS Power's transmission and distribution systems to enable firm delivery of their renewable low-impact electricity through the transmission and ancillary services provided under the OATT and via the distribution access provided under the DT. NS Power must also provide a broad range of generation services to the LRS, such as providing top-up and spill services under the EBS when the LRS is not able to provide enough energy to service its Retail Customers or is over-producing, as well as providing firm capacity under the SS to serve the LRS's Retail Customers whenever the LRS's generation is unavailable. As noted by Mr. Sidebottom in his testimony:

So until a customer is completely disconnected, and at that point I would agree, there are no services being provided, but when connected there are services being provided on reliability overall.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to the specific delivery and generation services the Company must provide to the LRS, NS Power must also be available to serve Retail Customers who wish to return to NS Power's bundled service. Finally, the guiding principles of the Act require that customers who choose not to enter into the RtR market do not incur any additional costs as a result of the introduction of this new market and that all such costs are borne by the LRS and their Retail Customers. As noted in the Opening Statement of the SBA:

The legislation was written in way that protects those customers who choose not to move to the Renewable to Retail ("RtR") market, which is important. A new market must be driven by supply and demand, not artificial subsidization. As a result the RtR market may be slow to develop and even drop back after an initial opening. That will not be a sign of failure but rather evidence that it is operating as a true open and competitive market.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 173-174, lines 21-22 and 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Exhibit N-43, Opening Statement of the Small Business Advocate, pages 1-2, lines 22-25 and 1-2.

#### 2.0 NS POWER REGULATIONS, GIP, OATT & MARKET RULES

The Company's proposed amendments to the NS Power Regulations, GIP, and OATT are supported by Mr. Whalen, who has recommended they be approved by the Board.<sup>7</sup> There has been no evidence filed to challenge these proposed amendments or any alternative revisions put forward to NS Power by any of the Intervenors. The amendments are an integral part of the overall market design and as such the Company submits that the amendments to the NS Power Regulations, GIP and OATT should be approved as filed.

Mr. Casey confirmed in his oral testimony that NS Power is not seeking specific approval of its proposed amendments to the Market Rules.<sup>8</sup> As noted in the Company's Settlement Report<sup>9</sup> and its Rebuttal Evidence,<sup>10</sup> the Nova Scotia Power System Operator (NSPSO) has concluded that the proposed amendments should be incorporated into the current Market Rules subject to and conditional upon the Board's decision on the Company's Application.<sup>11</sup> Revisions to the Company's RtR market framework may necessitate further amendments which the NSPSO would undertake in accordance with the procedures laid out in the Market Rules.

As noted in the Company's Application, for any Retail Customer site that is physically connected to NS Power's transmission system, NS Power will require the execution of a separate operating agreement between NS Power and the LRS's transmission-connected Retail Customer in order to establish the general obligations of the transmission-connected Retail Customer and address operational topics such as metering, load balance, harmonics, right-of-way and right-of-access. The operating agreement would be similar in form to the existing OATT Network Operating Agreement attached as Attachment G

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Exhibit N-31, Evidence of Multeese Consulting Inc. (Whalen), November 20, 2015, page 3, lines 7-8 and 22-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 271-272, lines 1-22 and 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Exhibit N-40, Settlement Report, December 21, 2015, page 11, lines 16-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016, pages 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The NSPSO's Final Report on the Proposed Market Rules Amendments was provided in Exhibit N-40, Settlement Report, December 21, 2015, Appendix B.

| to the OATT. <sup>12</sup> Additional amendments would be required to incorporate this new |
|--|
| Agreement into the OATT but would be relatively minor in nature. Subject to the            |
| Board's approval of the proposed market design framework, the Company proposes filing      |
| the form of Agreement and the additional amendments to the OATT with its Compliance        |
| Filing to be submitted to the Board for approval.  |

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 $<sup>^{12} \</sup> This \ document \ can \ be \ found \ at \ \underline{http://oasis.nspower.ca/site/media/oasis/ApprovedOATT052005.pdf}, \ on \ pages$ 146-162 of 162.

| Mr. Athas, on behalf of the SBA, disagrees with the pricing proposed in the EBS and has recommended NS Power adopt real time pricing where "prices vary according to the actual hour's marginal cost of generation."  Mr. Chernick, on behalf of the CA, has also expressed concern about the methodology in the EBS Tariff but stated that he "[does] not believe [Mr. Athas timing pricing approach] would be feasible until NS Power is better connected to energy markets."  On questioning from the Chair, Mr. Whalen stated that it would be too early in to market opening for the Company to adopt the real-time pricing approach recommendation.  |          |
|--|----------|
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| market opening for the Company to adopt the real-time pricing approach recom   | he RtR   |
|  | mended   |
| by Mr. Athas.  |          |
| 15   |          |
| THE CHAIR: [T]here's a couple of recommendations made that I   |          |
| wouldn't mind just getting your thoughts on. And we can do it in one of  |          |
| two ways. I think the easiest thing is to go to the Reply evidence for Nova  |          |
| Scotia Power, which is Exhibit 42, and go to first to page 8.  |          |
| There Neve Sectio Power comments on the suggestion's made by the   |          |
| There Nova Scotia Power comments on the suggestion's made by the Small Business Advocate. And the only one I want to get any comments  |          |
| There Nova Scotia Power comments on the suggestion's made by the Small Business Advocate. And the only one I want to get any comments that you have is number one, the:  "Energy balancing services should be priced on a real-time  |          |
| 24   |          |
| 25 "Energy balancing services should be priced on a real-time  |          |
| basis." (As read)  |          |
| 27   |          |
| Do you have anything any help you can add to that debate?  29  |          |
|  |          |
| MR. WHALEN: No, other than the fact that I think it's too early to do  |          |
| that before you have some idea of what the loads and what the generation   |          |
| would be. I mean, certainly you could look at real-time pricing; the   |          |
| MR. WHALEN: No, other than the fact that I think it's too early to do that before you have some idea of what the loads and what the generation would be. I mean, certainly you could look at real-time pricing; the company, I believe, already calculates that for other purposes. But whether that would be appropriate to renewable to retail market I think  |          |
| whether that would be appropriate to renewable to retail market I think would be a function of what load and generation the LRS has online.  |          |

Exhibit N-43, Opening Statement of the Small Business Advocate, page 4, lines 11-12.
 Exhibit N-48, Opening Statement of Paul Chernick on behalf of CA, page 1, lines 29-30.

| 1      |   |
|--------|---|
| 2 3    | When I say whether or not it would be appropriate, I mean the actual numbers as opposed to the concept.                                     |
| 4      | •   |
| 5<br>6 | THE CHAIR: So do you think that's something we may look at in the future, assuming this market evolves?                                     |
| 7      | MD WHALEN W A '1 Lat'l a A ' Cal A 1 A '1   |
| 8<br>9 | MR. WHALEN: Yes, certainly. I think that piece of that charge certainly would should be reviewed when there's some real generation and load |
| 10     | that is known and can assist with the simulation of this. 15  |
| 11     |   |
| 12     | NS Power agrees with Mr. Chernick and Mr. Whalen, that Mr. Athas's real-timing  |
| 13     | pricing approach is not appropriate for the EBS tariff, particularly at the early stages of   |
| 14     | the RtR market. As stated by NS Power in NSPI(CA) IR-8, the pattern of such RtR   |
| 15     | generation is not pre-determinable and as a result, cannot be used as a basis for   |
| 16     | determining hourly rate differentials.  |
| 17     |   |
| 18     | NS Power submits that the pricing methodology for the EBS and other RtR tariffs should  |
| 19     | remain as proposed due to its administrative simplicity, lower cost to administer and   |
| 20     | predictability, given the uncertain pace and composition of the RtR market opening. The   |
| 21     | annual setting of rates on a prospective basis as proposed by NS Power will avoid cos   |
| 22     | transfers to other customers.   |
| 23     |   |
| 24     | As set out in the evidence, the Company estimated annual avoided costs for the EBS  |
| 25     | Tariff based on multiple Plexos runs over a ten year period from 2018 to 2027 taking  |
| 26     | advantage of the 2014 IRP cost information to illustrate a longer-term pricing level under  |
| 27     | the top-up rate. 16 Commencing first with the Compliance Filing and then through the  |
| 28     | 2016 Annually Adjusted Rates (AAR) process for 2017 rates, avoided costs will be  |
| 29     | estimated on the basis of a single test year analysis, consistent with the treatment of fue   |
| 30     | costs of other annually adjusted rates.   |
| 31     |   |

 $<sup>^{15}</sup>$  Transcript, January 19, 2016, pages 375-377, lines 21-22, 1-22 and 1-16. Exhibit N-17, CA IR-16 and Exhibit N-29, SBA IR-10.

| Similarly, NS Power has proposed that the fuel and administrative-related costs of the          |
|---|
| EBS Tariff and SS Tariff be adjusted annually and prospectively through the AAR                 |
| process. <sup>17</sup> Cost mitigation components of the annually adjusted Energy Savings Credi |
| and the annually adjusted Demand Savings Credit, included in the RTT, will also be              |
| prospectively updated on an annual basis.   |

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Exhibit N-20, UARB IR-1(c).

| 1                          | 4.0 | EBS TARIFF  |
|----------------------------|-----|---|
| 2                          |     |   |
| 3                          |     | Multeese recommended NS Power provide further justification for the 1.38 cents per  |
| 4                          |     | kWh fuel cost adder included in the EBS Tariff top-up rate. 18 Mr. Whalen summarized  |
| 5                          |     | one of his two concerns with the fuel cost adder on questioning from the Board:   |
| 6                          |     |   |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10          |     | MR. WHALEN: No, I had issues with the 1.38 and with the underlying numbers, as I indicated in my evidence, because they were calculated on a 10-year present-value basis as opposed to being a current-year basis. <sup>19</sup>  |
| 11                         |     | On cross-examination by Mr. Dalgeish, Mr. Whalen confirmed that this concern had been   |
| 12                         |     | addressed <sup>20</sup> based on the confirmation provided by NS Power in its Rebuttal Evidence   |
| 13                         |     | that starting in the 2016 filing process for the 2017 AAR, the Company would be using a   |
| 14                         |     | fuel cost adder derived from a single test year. <sup>21</sup>  |
| 15                         |     |   |
| 16                         |     | Outside of this issue, Multeese did not appear to have issue with the rationale for the fue   |
| 17                         |     | cost adder. Indeed, Mr. Whalen confirmed that he was not opposed to the fuel cost adder   |
| 18                         |     | proposed by NS Power but questioned whether it was premature given the early stage of   |
| 19                         |     | the RtR market.   |
| 20                         |     |   |
| 21<br>22<br>23<br>24<br>25 |     | I'm not opposed to the adder at some point but I believe it's premature at this point unless there was some additional justification, which at this up till now I've not really heard anything that would cause me to say that that differential adder is required at this point. <sup>22</sup> |
| 26                         |     | NS Power submits that the use of the fuel cost adder in the EBS Tariff is not premature   |
| 27                         |     | and is appropriately included at this time. As set out in the Company's Rebutta   |
| 28                         |     | Evidence:   |
| 29                         |     |   |

Exhibit N-31, Evidence of Multeese Consulting Inc., (Whalen), November 20, 2015

19 Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 368, lines 2-6.

20 Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 382, lines 2-3.

21 Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016, page 26, lines 21-27.

22 Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 382, lines 5-10.

The 1.38 cents per kWh that is included in the EBS top-up rate represents the differential between the top-up costs over spill savings, determined through ten year cost simulations in the 2018-2027 period. The information included in the Company's Application was illustrative of this cost differential and based on information developed in the most recent Integrated Resource Planning initiative. Commencing with the 2016 filing process for the 2017 Annually Adjusted Rates, the Company intends to use a fuel cost adder derived from a single test year.

1 2

In general, the costs of top-up energy are expected to be higher than energy savings from spill due to a high correlation of wind patterns across the province of Nova Scotia (i.e. energy spill from wind generation in the RtR market is expected to coincide with high wind generation on NS Power's system and deliveries of top-up energy would coincide with low levels of wind generation on NS Power's system). Under the economic dispatch order, the Company avoids running more expensive thermal generation during periods of high wind generation. Thus, the avoided cost of thermal generation displaced by spill, occurring at the time of already high NS Power/contract wind generation, is lower than the incremental costs of thermal generation provided under top-up when NS Power/contract wind generation is low.<sup>23</sup>

Multeese also recommended setting the portions of the top-up and spill rates in the EBS Tariff that are based on fuel costs at NS Power's Load Following rate in the Generation Replacement and Load Following Tariff (GRLF or Load Following rate). NS Power submits that the use of a single rate such as the Load Following rate would not be appropriate as it would not account for the cost differential between providing top-up service to the LRS and acquiring spill energy from the LRS, and thereby increase the likelihood of cost transfer from the LRS's customers to non-RtR customers.

As noted above, based on the Company's simulations using Plexos, the costs of top-up energy are expected to be higher than the savings from spill, a fact which is independent of the pace of the development of the RtR market. In order to account for this difference and mitigate the risk of cost transfer to NS Power's remaining customers from the outset, the Company must include the spread between the spill and top-up rates. For as long as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016, pages 26-27, lines 21-33 and 1-5. <sup>24</sup> Exhibit N-31, Evidence of Multeese Consulting Inc. (Whalen), November 20, 2015, page 9, lines 19-26.

| 1  | specific EBS service uptake forecast is unavailable, the Company proposes to determine  |
|----|---|
| 2  | top-up and spill rates based on hourly profiles of NS Power's system load and wind      |
| 3  | generation scaled down to the annual energy level of 219 GWh each – an energy level     |
| 4  | commensurate with a 25 MW decrement. This approach will produce more equitable          |
| 5  | results in the allocation of fuel costs between FAM ratepayers and RtR customers than a |
|    |   |
| 6  | single rate approach which ignores the fuel cost differential between top-up and spill  |
| 7  | services.   |
| 8  |   |
| 9  | The Company's testimony on the proposed use of the Load Following rate was clear.       |
| 10 |   |
| 11 | MR. FERGUSON: The load-following rate is part of our generation                         |
| 12 | replacement, a load-following tariff, and it basically is a calculation of the          |
| 13 | marginal cost of serving a 25-megawatt decrement across the years. So do                |
| 14 | the math around the cost of fuel, take out a flat 25-megawatts across the               |
| 15 | year, and divide the differential fuel divided by the load and it produces              |
| 16 | the load following rate.  |
| 17 |   |
| 18 | MR. DHILLON: So your evidence basically that because of the                             |
| 19 | magnitude here that's not appropriate; am I right?                                      |
| 20 |   |
| 21 | MR. FERGUSON: Yes, we Mr. Whalen has suggested that we use a                            |
| 22 | single rate. Our concern with respect to a single rate for the top-up and the           |
| 23 | spill elements of the EBS, we think for the reasons put forward in our                  |
| 24 | evidence, and Mr. Sidebottom was speaking to them earlier, we think                     |
| 25 | there is a fundamental differential in the value between top-up                         |
| 26 | provided to the RT, to the licensed retail supplier, and spill purchased                |
| 27 | from the licensed retail supplier. So we think it's important to have                   |
| 28 | two rates and that they reflect the differential on value for                           |
| 29 | customers. <sup>25</sup>  |
| 30 | [emphasis added]  |
| 31 |   |
| 32 | The fact that the Load Following rate will not properly apportion costs for top-up and  |
| 33 | spill energy was further clarified by NS Power when asked by the Chair whether using    |
| 34 | that rate would be an appropriate proxy for the energy charge in the EBS.               |
| 35 |   |

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 $<sup>^{25}</sup>$  Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 258-59, lines 22 and 1-21.

| 1                          | THE CHAIR: And it's proven over time to have given you a reasonable  |
|----------------------------|--|
| 2                          | proxy for your marginal cost in circumstances where you have to supply   |
| 3                          | load to somebody who is relying on somebody else or themselves to  |
| 4                          | supply that load, which in theory is what you're doing here, isn't it?   |
| 5                          |  |
| 6                          | MR. GRUS: No, that's not what's going on here. This rate was designed  |
| 7                          | as a basically top-up rate, a load-following rate. So to the extent a  |
| 8                          | customer's generator operates below its established capacity the utility   |
| 9                          | provides – fills in the rest, provides following up in energy.   |
| 10                         |  |
| 11                         | THE CHAIR: Right. And when the wind isn't blowing and the LRS can't  |
| 12<br>13                   | supply its customers, you're going to do the same thing for him?   |
| 13                         | MD CDIIG A 1411 to a decrease to a decrease the reco   |
| 14                         | MR. GRUS: And this is not the same situation on the top-up spill. If for-  |
| 15                         | - first of all, the amount of fluctuations in spill and top-up loads is much   |
| 16<br>17                   | more than what we see on the load following. For RTR for LRS to  |
| 17<br>18                   | balance its energy with generation, assuming that renewable source is  |
| 19                         | intermittent and operates at much smaller load factor than loads it could<br>be 30 percent, for example, load could be 55 percent we are dealing |
| 20                         | with much bigger swings in of fluctuations in generation.  |
|                            | with inten digger swings in of fluctuations in generation.   |
| 21<br>22<br>23<br>24<br>25 | In 25 megawatt decrement case, the amount of spill could be as high as 70  |
| 23                         | megawatts. So that's the amount of generation, external generation that  |
| 24                         | utility has to absorb into its system by ramping down its generation. It   |
| 25                         | traverses more than capacity of one small generation unit. <sup>26</sup>   |
| 26                         |  |
| 27                         | In essence, the primary reason for the differentiation between rates is that when NS   |
| 28                         | Power is providing top-up energy from additional generation that generation will, on   |
| 29                         | average, be more expensive than the average annual marginal cost. When NS Power  |
| 30                         | takes spill energy, it cuts back on generation which will, on average, be lower than the   |
| 31                         | average annual marginal cost.  |
| 32                         |  |
| 33                         | NS Power submits that the proposed EBS rate structure, including a differential between  |
| 34                         | top-up and spill, is appropriate and should be approved.   |
|                            |  |

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 261-62, lines 3-22 and 1-11.

| 1  | 5.0 | REVENUE TO COST RATIOS   |
|--|-----|--|
| 2  |     |  |
| 3  |     | Mr. Chernick has argued that transmission and distribution rates in the RtR tariffs should   |
| 4  |     | be the same as the bundled service tariffs and reflect the revenue to cost (R/C) ratios in   |
| 5  |     | generation charges. <sup>27</sup>  |
| 6  |     |  |
| 7  |     | NS Power submits that the most appropriate approach for rate-making purposes is to set   |
| 8  |     | the various RtR tariff rates directly at cost without R/C adjustments for the reasons put  |
| 9  |     | forward in its evidence. <sup>28</sup> The charges under the EBS and SS Tariffs and the OATT   |
| 10   |     | cannot be the same as those charges under the bundled services tariffs. RtR charges are  |
| 11   |     | incapable of adjustment for individual class R/C ratios. As explained by Mr. Cary on   |
| 12   |     | questioning by the Chair:  |
| 13   |     |  |
| 14<br>15<br>16<br>17   |     | MR. CARY:Yeah, we're talking about the charges that go through the LRS. If we look for, example, at the top-up rate, the amount of top-up is calculated by the total amount of the customer load, which will be from a multiplicity of different customer classes, adjusted for the distribution |
| 18<br>19<br>20   |     | losses, netted off by the total amount of the generation, which may come from different classes of generation, net of the transmission losses.   |
| 21<br>22<br>23   |     | So there is no sort of single R/C ratio that can be applied to that mass of customer load net of the generation because everything's being melded together in that way. That's what that is trying to say.   |
| <ul><li>24</li><li>25</li><li>26</li><li>27</li><li>28</li></ul> |     | THE CHAIR: If a LRS seller were only selling to domestic customers, in other words, customers who would otherwise qualify for the Nova Scotia Power domestic class, would your answer be the same?   |
| 29<br>30<br>31<br>32   |     | MR. CARY: No, obviously if one were selling only to one class of customers, but as I have said, the when I talked about rate design, we've tried to be agnostic recognizing that rates have to be the same across the board. <sup>29</sup>   |

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Exhibit N-34, Evidence of Resource Insight, Inc. (Chernick), November 20, 2015, pages 4-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016, pages 13-14 and Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, Appendix 11, Distribution Tariff Rate Strawman Report, page 51-52 of 80. <sup>29</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 277-278, lines 12-22 and 1-11.

| 1        | Mr. Chernick has asserted that the Company should amend the OATT to charge the same     |
|----------|---|
| 2        | transmission charges to RtR customers as it does for bundled service. However, as       |
| 3        | further clarified by Mr. Cary, such amendments may have the effect of undermining the   |
| 4        | non-discriminatory nature of the OATT.  |
|          | non discriminatory nature of the OTTT.  |
| 5        |   |
| 6        | MR. CARY: Yeah, the OATT serves the wholesale market as well as the                     |
| 7        | retail market, the RTR market. We don't want to introduce a different set               |
| 8        | of rules for the different classes of customers using that OATT as between              |
| 9        | the wholesale and the retail RTR LRS'. 30   |
| 10       |   |
| 11       | On questioning from the Chair, Mr. Whalen confirmed the impracticalities of adjusting   |
| 12       | the RtR tariffs for R/C ratios and the minimal impact that would have on the individual |
| 13       | rates:  |
| 14       |   |
| 15       | THE CHAIR: Okaydo you have any additional comments or                                   |
| 16       | suggestions with respect to the recommendation Mr. Chernick's view is                   |
| 17       | that unless we take into account revenue-to-cost ratios we're being unfair              |
| 18       | to the LRS customers?   |
| 19       |   |
| 20       | MR. WHALEN: It's quite difficult, and it's not a concern for me from                    |
| 21       | this perspective that you're breaking the different functions apart,                    |
| 22       | generation, transmission and the distribution, including retail.                        |
| 23<br>24 | On the generation side, the there's some of the fixed costs that are being              |
| 25       | reflected. But they're being applied, as the company points out, to the total           |
| 26       | integrated load of the LRS. They're not being applied on a class-specific               |
| 27       | basis. So it's very challenging, perhaps impossible, to be able to apply                |
| 28       | revenue/cost ratios on the generation side.   |
| 29       | - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·   |
| 30       | On the transmission side, the application of the OATT is, again, a very                 |
| 31       | different approach from the cost of service, and essentially divides the cost           |
| 32       | of the transmission across the users of the transmission and does it on the             |
| 33       | basis of considering all those costs to be demand and designing them on                 |
| 34       | the cost on the basis of a non-coincident demand. So wholesale users are                |
| 35       | assigned a certain portion, NSPI is assigned a certain portion, renewable to            |
| 36       | retail would be assigned a certain portion.   |

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, page 279, lines 6-10.

1 Now, when NSPI take sale [sic: takes a] portion back into their cost of 2 service and choose to classify a piece of that as energy and let it flow 3 through the cost of service the way it does that's kind of internal to the 4 cost of service. Other people who are using the transmission may do 5 something different in the way that they recover the transmission from 6 their customers. 7 8 So if I take the generation and the transmission away and I'm looking only 9 at distribution there are a couple of issues with that. One is if you apply 10 the revenue/cost ratios only to the distribution revenue requirements 11 you won't get back to the full revenue requirement of the distribution system, it'll be different. So there's -- you have to sort out what to do 12 with that differential, either plus or minus. One option would be to put it 13 over in the RTT or something like that, but there's an issue there. 14 15 16 The second issue, and this one probably overrides it all for me, is that 17 the distribution piece is roughly 20 percent of the total revenue requirement, and the maximum difference in the revenue/cost ratio is 18 about 4 percent, so the maximum difference you'd be talking about 19 would be .8 percent.<sup>31</sup> 20 21 22 [emphasis added]

 $^{31}$  Transcript, January 19, 2016, pages 377-80, lines 21-22, 1-22, 1-22 and 1-3.

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#### 6.0 NON-POWER CHARGES IN DISTRIBUTION TARIFF

In his evidence, Mr. Chernick expressed concern with respect to language in Section 11.2 of the DT which provides that certain non-power charges are included in the DT charges applicable to the Retail Customer. Mr. Chernick recommended that the language on these non-power charges in the DT be reconciled with that in the bundled service tariffs, noting that "Unless NS Power can justify this language, it should be deleted. The same rules should apply to all customers."

NS Power confirmed in its Rebuttal Evidence that its non-power charge practices will be consistent for both bundled services customers and RtR Customers and that the provision in the DT for non-power charges reflects NS Power's existing practices for bundled service customers.<sup>33</sup> In brief, the same rules will apply to both RtR customers under DT and bundled service customers under NS Power's Regulations.

Mr. Chernick did not raise any issue in his evidence with respect to the non-power charges themselves or their applicability in the context of the DT. However, he asserted that "as a matter of transparency," NS Power should have the same language in both the DT and the bundled service tariffs or have Regulation 7.1 apply to both the Retail Customers and the bundled service customers.

If Regulation 7.1 is adequate for the full-service customers, a reference to Regulation 7.1 should be adequate for the RtR customers. If the language in the proposed RtR distribution tariff is necessary in that tariff, it should also be in the full-service tariff. Customers should be able to see at a glance that the rules are the same for RtR and full-requirements customers taking the same service, whether for distribution rates, transmission rates or non-power charges.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Exhibit N-34, Evidence of Resource Insight, Inc. (Chernick), November 20, 2015, page 14, lines 9-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016, pages 19-20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Exhibit N-48, Opening Statement of Paul Chernick on behalf of CA, page 2, lines 21-25.

| NS Power submits no further adjustment is required to the DT. Section 6 of the DT                |
|--|
| already provides that the NS Power Regulations apply to an RtR Customer receiving                |
| Distribution System Access under the DT. <sup>35</sup> Section 11.2(c) of the DT is provided for |
| transparency to ensure RtR Customers are aware that they will be charged for the                 |
| particular items listed. Including specific language from the NS Power Regulations in the        |
| DT is not necessary at this stage and it creates the risk of inconsistency in the event that     |
| changes in the NS Power Regulations were not simultaneously updated in the                       |
| Distribution Tariff.   |

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 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 35}$  Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, Appendix 17, page 8 of 21.

| 1                          | <b>7.0</b> | LOCATIONAL LINE LOSSES  |
|----------------------------|------------|---|
| 2                          |            |   |
| 3                          |            | The CA has recommended that the Board direct NS Power to recognize the effect of  |
| 4                          |            | renewable generator location on line losses. <sup>36</sup>  |
| 5                          |            |   |
| 6                          |            | Network Integration Transmission Service (Network Service) applies to the RtR Market.   |
| 7                          |            | As stated by the Company in its response to U-2:  |
| 8                          |            |   |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13  |            | Network Service allows the LRS to designate its designated RtR generators (Network Resources) and use the transmission system to serve its geographically dispersed RtR customer load (Network Load) in a manner comparable to that which NS Power utilizes to serve its customers. Network Service is an annual, firm service. <sup>37</sup>                     |
| 14                         |            |   |
| 15                         |            | The use of a system average loss factor, which is calculated annually, applies to Network   |
| 16                         |            | Service under the OATT. As stated by Mr. Sidebottom:  |
| 17                         |            |   |
| 18<br>19<br>20<br>21       |            | MR. SIDEBOTTOM: Our overall losses on the system actually repeat on an annual basis. So it actually makes a lot of sense. It takes in both the day and the night and the seasonality. So that creates the a reasonable backdrop for estimating the actual cost of losses. <sup>38</sup>   |
| 22                         |            |   |
| 23                         |            | If the Board were to direct the Company to offer locational losses in conjunction with  |
| 24                         |            | Network Service, the OATT would have to be amended. Such a step would distinguish   |
| 25                         |            | Nova Scotia from all other OATT jurisdictions in Canada. As noted by Mr. Cary:  |
| 26                         |            |   |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30<br>31 |            | MR. CARY: Directionally you'd have to put in some sort of locational loss table into the OATT to reflect that instead of using a single average, remembering that that single point averages is, you know, a pretty broad precedent for OATT coming right from the FERC original standard. So philosophically we'd be making a major departure from the pro forma |
|                            |            |   |

Exhibit N-34, Evidence of Resource Insight, Inc. (Chernick), November 20, 2015, page 4, lines 3-4.
 Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-2.
 Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 245-46, lines 20-22 and 1-3.

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| 1<br>2<br>3                            | that's been used so far and the principles that have been broadly applied elsewhere. <sup>39</sup>  |
|--|---|
| 4                                      | Mr. Cary testified that no other jurisdiction in Canada that uses an OATT recognizes  |
| 5                                      | locational losses on network service. 40 Mr. Chernick initially stated his understanding  |
| 6                                      | that the province of Ontario used locational marginal losses. However, after further  |
| 7                                      | researching the matter, he confirmed Ontario uses the province-wide average loss value  |
| 8                                      | for settlement purposes. <sup>41</sup>  |
| 9                                      |   |
| 10                                     | The Company had considered the applicability of Point-To-Point Service for the RtR  |
| 11                                     | market, but concluded that Network Integration Service was the most appropriate form of   |
| 12                                     | transmission service for RtR market transactions.42 Mr. Whalen agreed with the  |
| 13                                     | Company's determination that Network Service was in fact the most appropriate. <sup>43</sup>  |
| 14                                     |   |
| 15                                     | On cross-examination by Board Counsel, the Company was asked whether an LRS could   |
| 16                                     | choose to take Point-To-Point service. The Company determined that although Point-To-   |
| 17                                     | Point service was originally intended for NS import/export service or pass-through  |
| 18                                     | service, an LRS could take such service but only for transmission connected generation  |
| 19                                     | and load.   |
| 20                                     |   |
| 21                                     | The issue was further examined in Undertaking U-2.  |
| 22                                     |   |
| 23<br>24<br>25<br>26<br>27<br>28<br>29 | Point-To-Point service was originally intended for NS import/export service or pass-through service (a generator external to NS for export from NS). The Company has reviewed the OATT and determined that the OATT does not specifically prevent use of Point-To-Point service for internal service (i.e. within Nova Scotia). However, the OATT applies only to transmission-connected generation and load. As a result, if an LRS was to choose Point-To-Point service, such service would be limited to |
| 30                                     | RtR transactions which met this connection requirement. An LRS would  |

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Transcript, January 18, 2016, page 212, lines 6-14.

Transcript, January 18, 2016, page 212, lines 20-22.

Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-4

Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-2, page 1, lines 23-26.

Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 371, lines 9-10.

| 1<br>2                                       | not be able to use Point-To-Point Service for distribution-connected RtR generators or distribution-connected RtR load.   |
|--|---|
| 3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11  | If Point-To-Point service was made available for the RtR Market, the LRS would designate each of the Point(s) of Receipt (RtR generator) and Delivery (RtR transmission-connected load) for which they are reserving firm capacity. The LRS's billable reserved capacity would be the sum of these capacity reservations. Any request by an LRS to modify Receipt and Delivery Points on a firm basis would be treated as a new request for service, requiring a new application and potentially system impact studies for the incremental reserved capacity. <sup>44</sup> |
| 12   | In addition, the Company noted a number of complications that would arise through the   |
| 13   | application of Point-To-Point Service to the RtR market, including the fact that Point-To-  |
| 14   | Point Service is a higher cost service than Network Service for a comparable load. <sup>45</sup>  |
| 15   |   |
| 16   | The Company notes that there has been no evidence filed with respect to how locational  |
| 17   | losses should be calculated for the RtR market. The complexity involved with  |
| 18   | calculating locational losses was highlighted by Mr. Whalen:  |
| 19   |   |
| 20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24<br>25<br>26       | It's always a bit of a question as to exactly how you do that calculation. And we talked yesterday, when Mr. Outhouse was cross-examining the company, about sometimes you could have a wind generator in Cape Breton displacing a thermal plant in Cape Breton and in that hour there's no effect on losses, and there were different scenarios that were considered.  |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30<br>31<br>32<br>33<br>34 | So the question would be, how do you develop what would be the appropriate adjustments that you might make, that you might apply to these generators to recognize that if you put it in one location versus another you ought to somehow penalize it or credit it in some way.  MR. DHILLON: So when you say "appropriate," this can be calculated, a rough idea of loss factors. So and there's no problem that there's a possibility that NSP could calculate roughly what the loss factor would be,  |
| 35<br>36                                     | I guess? Then it's a matter of whether we agree to apply or not.  |

 $<sup>^{44}</sup>$  Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-2, pages 1-2, lines 28-29 and 1-13. Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-2, pages 2-3.

MR. WHALEN: Certainly, as was indicated by Mr. Chernick earlier, that has been done, some indication. What I'm not familiar with is how that was done and whether that would be appropriate to apply here. Certainly the calculation of losses, as the company indicated yesterday, is not a straightforward thing. Losses are different in every hour, as load changes, as generation changes. And so trying to calculate what that is on average across the transmission system is challenging. To be able to take it to another level to estimate how will it change if I put generator A at one location versus another is an even more challenging piece.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 372-373, lines 3-22 and 1-11.

| 1                          | 8.0 | UNBUNDLING OF RATES   |
|----------------------------|-----|---|
| 2                          |     |   |
| 3                          |     | Although not put forward in his list of recommendations to the Board <sup>47</sup> , Mr. Chernick, on   |
| 4                          |     | behalf of the CA, has suggested that NS Power unbundle its bundled service rates into the   |
| 5                          |     | functions of distribution, transmission and generation at its next General Rate   |
| 6                          |     | Application.  |
| 7                          |     |   |
| 8                          |     | NS Power submits that the Board should not order the functional unbundling of the   |
| 9                          |     | Company's bundled service rates as part of this proceeding. In the Company's view,  |
| 10                         |     | such a step would be beyond the scope of this proceeding as it would require amendments   |
| 11                         |     | to non-RtR tariffs that are not necessary for the purposes of facilitating the purchase of  |
| 12                         |     | renewable low impact electricity under the Act.   |
| 13                         |     |   |
| 14                         |     | While Mr. Chernick stated he had been involved in restructuring cases in New England  |
| 15                         |     | and Maryland that involved unbundling and "sort of watched it out of the corner of my   |
| 16                         |     | eye," he acknowledged that he has not been directly involved in such a process. <sup>48</sup> When  |
| 17                         |     | asked whether he thought that such a process would be complicated or time-consuming   |
| 18                         |     | and expensive, Mr. Chernick responded:  |
| 19                         |     |   |
| 20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 |     | I guess it's not exactly an automatic process because you have questions like you have a commercial class with both demand charges and energy charges But I think it may be more than a paper hearing but I wouldn't expect this kind of procedure. <sup>49</sup> |
| 25                         |     | The Company has identified a number of challenges and concerns associated with  |
| 26                         |     | breaking out bundled service tariffs into functional areas:   |
| 27                         |     |   |
| 28<br>29<br>30             |     | (1) Class rate structures are not fully aligned with the underlying demand, energy, and customer-related class cost components in the COSS for the following reasons:   |
|                            |     |   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Exhibit N-34, Evidence of Resource Insight, Inc. (Chernick), November 20, 2015, pages 3-4, lines 9-25 and 1-13. <sup>48</sup> Transcript, January 19, 2016, pages 308-09, lines 17-22 and 1. <sup>49</sup> Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 309, lines 9-11 and 19-20.

| 1<br>2<br>3                |                | (a) Total class revenues vary from total class costs from the COSS due to the application of R/C ratios and cost deferrals. |
|----------------------------|----------------|---|
| 4<br>5<br>6                |                | (b) In General Rate Application (GRA) proceedings, rate changes are generally applied across-the-board to demand            |
| 7                          |                | and energy charge components. This does not reflect the   |
| 8                          |                | difference in increases of demand and energy-related costs in the COSS. Since 2003 customer charges for the two             |
| 10                         |                | Domestic and the Small General class have remained  |
| 11                         |                | frozen at their level from the 2001 GRA.  |
| 12                         |                | Hozen at their level from the 2001 Givit.   |
| 13                         | (2)            | The COSS is conducted jointly for both Domestic and Domestic  |
| 14                         | (=)            | Time-of-Day (TOD) classes. The COSS does not provide cost   |
| 15                         |                | information for these two classes separately. Further, the time   |
| 16                         |                | differentiation of energy charges under the TOD Domestic rate   |
| 17                         |                | reflects time-differentiation of generation costs. The transmission   |
| 18                         |                | and distribution costs are not time differentiated. The COSS does   |
| 19                         |                | not differentiate class costs by TOD periods and as such does not   |
| 20                         |                | provide a basis for functionalization of the TOD components.  |
|                            |                |   |
| 21<br>22<br>23<br>24<br>25 | (3)            | The declining block energy rate components for the Small General,   |
| 23                         |                | General and Small Industrial Rate classes have been designed to   |
| 24                         |                | reduce volatility in recovery of the utility's fixed costs through the  |
| 25                         |                | application of a more expensive first block energy component to a   |
| 26                         |                | relatively stable amount of class energy falling into the first block.  |
| 27                         |                | The size of the first energy block is a function of customer  |
| 28                         |                | consumption patterns in each class. Its design predates in some   |
| 29                         |                | cases changes in class average customer consumption due to  |
| 30                         |                | changes in tariff availability clauses. The COSS does not provide   |
| 31                         |                | guidance as to the amount of fixed costs from each functional area  |
| 32                         |                | to be recovered through the first versus second energy block rates.   |
| 33                         | (4)            |   |
| 34                         | (4)            | Customer-related costs are recovered through demand and energy  |
| 35                         |                | charges. It is not known how much of distribution-related   |
| 36                         |                | customer costs and retail costs should be assumed to be recovered   |
| 37<br>38                   |                | through each of the demand and energy charges. <sup>50</sup>  |
| 30                         |                |   |
| 39                         | •              | y submits that such a process would require stakeholder consultation  |
| 40                         | particularly w | ith respect to the vetting of the Company's underlying assumptions, and has   |
| 41                         | the notential  | to become a complicated and time consuming regulatory exercise. Such a  |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-1, pages 2-3, lines 10-29, 1-20.

| 1  | process is unwarranted and would be premature given the pace and scope of the market               |
|----|--|
| 2  | uptake at this stage is still unknown. As noted by the SBA in his Opening Statement,               |
| 3  | "the RtR market may be slow to develop and even drop back after an initial opening." <sup>51</sup> |
| 4  |  |
|    |  |
| 5  | In addition, NS Power questions the purposes for which such information could be used.             |
| 6  | On cross-examination Mr. Chernick indicated that the reasons behind his request for                |
| 7  | unbundling were for the purposes of transparency and administrative convenience.                   |
| 8  |  |
| 9  | MR. CHERNICK: The difference is that in the short-term approach, a                                 |
| 10 | customer who is thinking about becoming an RTR customer can't look at                              |
| 11 | their current tariff and say, "That's the distribution rate I would be charged                     |
| 12 | I'm being charged now, and here is the distribution charge on the RTR                              |
| 13 | rate."   |
| 14 |  |
| 15 | MR. OUTHOUSE: M'hm.  |
| 16 |  |
| 17 | MR. CHERNICK: There's an RTR charge and my LRS NSP, the Board                                      |
| 18 | may tell me that that's the same as what's wrapped up in that other in                             |
| 19 | the current bill, but I have to take their word for it.  |
| 20 |  |
| 21 | MR. OUTHOUSE: Okay, so   |
| 22 |  |
| 23 | MR. CHERNICK: In Massachusetts, I can look at my bill and I see I get a                            |
| 24 | distribution charge regardless of whether I go shopping or stay with utility.                      |
| 25 | I get a transmission charge that's the same, and it's only the generation                          |
| 26 | charges that differ.   |
| 27 |  |
| 28 | MR. OUTHOUSE: Okay. So is it just transparency? Are the results the                                |
| 29 | same and it's just transparency we're talking about, to do the unbundling?                         |
| 30 |  |
| 31 | MR. CHERNICK: Yes. It's transparency, and I think it would be more                                 |
| 32 | administratively convenient as we go forward, because if you have to have                          |
| 33 | an unbundled rate for the RTR customers then you might as well have it                             |
| 34 | for for everybody. Do it once in every GRA. <sup>52</sup>  |
| 35 |  |
|    |  |

Exhibit N-43, Opening Statement of the SBA, pages 1-2. Transcript, January 19, 2016, pages 312-13, lines 7-22 and 1-13.

| However, using unbundled rate information for the purposes of allowing customers to |
|---|
| compare rates in the two markets has the potential to mislead customers rather than |
| inform them. As stated by the Company in its response to Undertaking U-1:           |

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(1) The LRS is expected to base its charges to the market on what the market will bear for all of its services, other than distribution. As such, there is no certainty that broken out regulated rates for generation and transmission services would provide an appropriate "apples to apples" comparison.

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(2) Generation and Transmission costs are proposed to be recovered from the LRS through the OATT and a suite of generation-related tariffs (EBS, SS, RTT) applicable to the aggregated load of the LRS' end-use customers. All of these tariffs have different rate structures and billing determinants from those implicitly embedded in the individual bundled service class rates. In addition, the generation services provided in the RtR market differ markedly from those in the full service market. In the RtR market, the Company provides only ancillary generation services complementary to the primary renewable generation services of the LRS. In NS Power's view, a direct comparison of generation and transmission costs, under the two markets, for individual end-use customers, is not possible.<sup>53</sup>

23

<sup>53</sup> Exhibit N-51, Undertaking U-1

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| 1  | 9.0 | RTR TRANSITION TARIFF  |
|--|-----|--|
| 2  |     |  |
| 3  |     | SWEB was critical of the proposed RTT. <sup>54</sup> NS Power notes that the purpose of the RTT  |
| 4  |     | is to comply with the guiding principles in the Act by ensuring there is no cost-transfer to   |
| 5  |     | NS Power's customers as a result of the introduction of the RtR market. Section 3G(2) of   |
| _  |     |  |
| 6  |     | the Act provides as follows:   |
| 7  |     |  |
| 8<br>9<br>10                                       |     | 3G (2) In reviewing and approving the tariffs, procedures and standards of conduct required to be developed or amended pursuant to this Section, the Board shall be guided by the following principles:  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19 |     | <ul> <li>(a) customers of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and persons who, at the coming into force of this Section, are independent power producers or hold feed-in tariff approvals within the meaning of the regulations are not to be negatively affected if some retail customers choose to purchase renewable low-impact electricity from a retail supplier;</li> <li>(b) retail suppliers and their customers are to be</li> </ul> |
| 21<br>22<br>23<br>24<br>25<br>26                   |     | responsible for all costs related to the provision of service by retail suppliers to their customers that would otherwise be the responsibility of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and its customers.  [emphasis added]   |
| 27   |     |  |
| 28   |     | The RTT is supported by Multeese, <sup>55</sup> who provided the following succinct summary of   |
| 29   |     | its purpose.   |
| 30   |     |  |
| 31<br>32<br>33<br>34<br>35<br>36                   |     | As specified in Section G(3) of the Act, NS Power customers who choose to remain with NS Power rather than switch to an LRS are not to be negatively impacted by the introduction of RtR. Any customers who do move to an LRS will continue to pay their share of transmission and distribution through the OATT and the DT respectively. The only costs not fully recovered through other tariffs are fixed generation costs. Within    |
|  |     |  |

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Exhibit N-49, Opening Statement of SWEB, page 4, lines 8-9.

Exhibit N-31, Evidence of Multeese Consulting Inc. (Whalen), November 20, 2015, pages 12-13, lines 28 and 1-

| 1                          | the cost of service, these costs are classified in part as energy and in part as   |
|----------------------------|--|
| 2 3                        | demand. A portion of the costs classified as energy is recovered through<br>the EBS and a portion of the costs classified as demand is recovered |
| 4                          | through the SS. The RTT is designed to recover the remaining portions of   |
| 5                          | those costs.   |
| 6                          | //   |
| 7                          | When customers leave NS Power and take supply from an LRS, their total   |
| 8                          | energy and demand requirements do not change. NS Power will continue   |
| 9                          | to supply some energy as top-up energy under the EBS and some demand   |
| 10                         | under the SS. The portions that NS Power will no longer supply will be   |
| 11                         | the energy and demand being supplied by the LRS, and it is to those  |
| 12                         | quantities that the RTT will apply, to ensure that the fixed costs of  |
| 13                         | generation associated with these continue to be recovered from the   |
| 14                         | customers who were paying them before they switched to an LRS, and are   |
| 15                         | not left to be recovered from customers who remain with NS Power. <sup>56</sup>  |
| 16                         |  |
| 17                         | Notwithstanding SWEB's criticism of the RTT, Multeese confirmed no changes were  |
| 18                         | required to RTT to minimize its impact.  |
| 19                         |  |
| 20                         | THE CHAIR: Obviously a point of contention in the hearing is this  |
| 21                         | transmission tariff. And firstly, as I read your evidence, you agree with  |
| 22                         | the necessity of a transmission tariff sorry; Transition Tariff?   |
| 23                         |  |
| 22<br>23<br>24<br>25<br>26 | MR. WHALEN: Yes, I do.   |
| 25                         |  |
|                            | THE CHAIR: Do you have any suggestions other than what have been   |
| 27                         | made already with respect to how we might minimize the effect of that?   |
| 28                         |  |
| 29                         | MR. WHALEN: I don't really, in the near term. In the longer term I think   |
| 30                         | it takes care of itself, only in the sense that as generation changes, if a unit   |
| 31                         | retires the O&M will change, depreciation might change, those kinds of   |
| 32                         | things, that will reflect themselves in rates. But in terms of being able to   |
| 33                         | put something in the rate now in anticipation of something that will   |
| 34<br>35                   | happen five years from now, I think that's quite challenging to be able to do that. <sup>57</sup>  |
| 35<br>36                   | do that.   |
|                            |  |
| 37                         | NS Power recognizes it has an obligation to mitigate the amount it recovers through the  |
| 38                         | RTT. However, the Company's ability to mitigate these costs is limited by its ongoing  |
| 39                         | obligation to serve as NS Power must maintain its generation capacity in the event   |

Exhibit N-31, Evidence of Multeese Consulting Inc. November 20, 2015, page 12, lines 4-11 and 19-26. Transcript, January 19, 2016, page 375, lines 3-20.

| 1        | departed Retail Customers return to NS Power's bundled service. <sup>58</sup> As stated in the  |
|----------|---|
| 2        | Company's Application, savings to the amount charged through the RTT will be based on   |
| 3        | the volume and class make-up of any departing load as well as future utility matters. To  |
| 4        | minimize the risk of over or under -recovery, the Company will adjust the RTT as part of  |
| 5        | the AAR process based on its forecast of avoided fixed and variable costs. <sup>59</sup>  |
| 6        |   |
| 7        | SWEB <sup>60</sup> and Scotia Windfields <sup>61</sup> suggested in their Opening Statements that the cost of                               |
| 8        | any stranded assets associated with the introduction of the RtR market should be borne by   |
| 9        | NS Power and its shareholders.  |
| 10       |   |
| 11       | The Company submits that this position is untenable for three reasons. First, as noted  |
| 12       | above, Section 3G(2) of the Act provides NS Power customers are not to be negatively  |
| 13       | affected by the introduction of the RtR market and that all costs related to the provision of   |
| 14       | this service that would otherwise be the responsibility of NS Power and its customers are   |
| 15       | to be recovered from the LRS and its Retail Customers. Generation-related fixed costs   |
| 16       | that would be transferred to bundled service customers are a direct cost related to the   |
| 17       | introduction of the RtR market and are therefore the responsibility of the LRS and its  |
| 18       | Retail Customers and not NS Power and its customers.  |
| 19       |   |
| 20       | Second, NS Power is entitled under the Public Utilities Act to recovery of and a return on  |
| 21       | the prudent investments it makes in its regulated assets. <sup>62</sup> This is also a generally  |
| 22       | accepted principle of utility rate-making. As noted by the Board in its Decision on the   |
| 23       | 2013 General Rate Application:  |
| 24       |   |
| 25       | [19] NSPI, like all other business, experiences cost increases in virtually   |
| 26<br>27 | every expense it incurs to produce electricity for the people of Nova Scotia. The Act requires the Board to ensure these prudent and proper |
| 28       | costs are recovered in NSPI's rates.  |
| _        |   |

Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, page 70.
 Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, page 70, lines 19-23.
 Exhibit N-49, Opening Statement of SWEB, pages 3-4, lines 16-28 and lines 11-12.
 Exhibit N-50, Opening Statement of Scotian Windfields.
 Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380.

| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9                | [20] A fair return on rate base is important for the sustainability of the service. A low return on rate base may cause people to not invest in the Utility. It may also lead to a poor bond rating, which may cause financial institutions to increase the rate of interest on monies NSPI needs to borrow to provide the service. This may result in NSPI's rates increasing solely to cover the additional costs of borrowing money, without even addressing the increases in the operating expenses. <sup>63</sup> |
|--|--|
| 10   | Indeed, the Company's entitlement to recover on its regulated assets was acknowledged  |
| 11   | by Mr. Roscoe on questions from the Chair:   |
| 12   |  |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | THE CHAIR:  //  But obviously there's a difficult issue here with respect to how this might work, and I guess I'm going to ask you, do you acknowledge that the provisions of the Public Utilities Act that require the Board to allow Nova Scotia Power the opportunity to recover its prudently incurred costs and earn a reasonable rate of return have not been amended?  MR. ROSCOE: Yeah, I can acknowledge that, yes. <sup>64</sup>   |
| 23   | Finally, in NS Power's view, sanctioning the Company by not allowing the recovery of   |
| 24   | the costs covered by the RTT tariff would effectively change the regulatory construct  |
| 25   | significantly increasing the risk profile and cost of capital to be borne by customers in the  |
| 26   | RTR and bundled service markets.   |

<sup>63</sup> Decision, 2012 NSUARB 227 (M04972) paragraphs 19-20. <sup>64</sup> Transcript, January 19, 2016, pages 355-56, lines 16-22 and 1-2.

#### 10.0 BEHIND THE METER

There has been much discussion as to the issue of the applicability of the RtR framework to "behind the meter" generation. At the outset, the Company notes that the proposed RtR framework is designed so that the RtR tariffs apply to all RtR transactions regardless of the physical location of the generator and the customer's NS Power meter. In addition, the RtR framework does not provide for partial service. It is premised upon a customer's site taking either bundled service from the Company under its bundled service rates or RtR service from an LRS as enabled by the RtR tariffs. The RtR framework is not designed to allow customers to blend bundled service and RtR service within the hour or at different times during the year. However, as noted in the Company's Application, where a customer has multiple separate accounts, indirect partial service can be achieved by taking RtR service through one or more of the customer's individual accounts<sup>65</sup>

Mr. Sidebottom confirmed in his evidence that whether a transaction is "behind the meter" or in front of the meter, NS Power's assets are used in the same manner.

MR. MERRICK: Yet wouldn't you agree that some of those provisions may have to change if they are being applied to behind-the-meter scenarios as opposed to in-front-of-the-meter scenarios?

MR. SIDEBOTTOM: Whether the generation is in-front-of-the-meter or behind-the-meter it has practically the same effect on the electrical grid.

You know, when you take a look at a -- the provision of reliability, back up, effectively storage of the product, if it's going to be produced more at one time and consumed at a different time by a customer, there's a whole range of other services that are beyond the what I would call the simple megawatt hour or kilowatt hour.

All too often we talk about the kilowatt hour alone. There are many more attributes to reliable service to customers such as backing them up, following their load exactly, ensuring you have a plan to back up that generation when generation fails.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, September 1, 2015, Section 6.4, page 35-36.

| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4           | So all of those are other services required both in front of and behind-themeter. <sup>66</sup>  |
|----------------------------|--|
| 5                          | This point was further confirmed by Mr. Sidebottom on cross-examination by Mr. Lisi:   |
| 6                          |  |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10          | MR. SIDEBOTTOM: So I think I go back to what I've said before, whether the generation is behind or in-front-of-the-meter they look very similar electrically, and the tariffs are set up to recognize the services being provided by the retail supplier.  |
| 12<br>13<br>14             | And so the fact that we do revisit those rates on an annual basis, and we have an ability to study the development of the market, I think those provide us the opportunities to measure the success.   |
| 16<br>17<br>18             | And, again, going back to the fact that I don't actually see much or any difference, really, between behind-the-meter and in-front-of-the-meter. <sup>67</sup>   |
| 9                          | As such, the Company submits that the RtR tariffs should apply to behind the meter   |
| 20                         | transactions in order to avoid contravening the no-cost transfer principles under Section  |
| 21                         | 3G(2) of the Act.  |
| 22                         |  |
| 23<br>24<br>25<br>26<br>27 | MR. CARY: We come back to the fundamental principles that are guiding us here. If what you are doing is enabled by the RTR service provisions and is RTR service, then Nova Scotia Power is bound to submit tariffs that avoid cost transfer to others.  |
| 28<br>29<br>80             | So that follows, so therefore we are not talking basically about relief because of the different services. We're talking about following that fundamental principle that applies here.   |
| 31<br>32<br>33<br>34<br>35 | MR. LISI: Okay. But is it possible that when an RTR supplies a customer that your system actually incurs a savings? And what I mean is, when you transmit electricity from your generator all the way through transmission and through the distribution to the customer, you are utilizing machinery |
| 36<br>37<br>38             | that requires maintenance, require replacements, that the legal transformers on the pole, everything from the point of generation to the customer has a certain life cycle which you need to maintain on a regular   |

 $<sup>^{66}</sup>$  Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 96-97, lines 13-22 and 1-10.  $^{67}$  Transcript, January 18, 2016, page 179, lines 7-18.

| 1<br>2<br>3                      | basis for which you spend money to make sure they are working properly. The less you send through it's a little bit like an automobile doing less mileage. Probably you'll use less oil; you'll use less wear and tear.   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9       | So what happens if all your system, because it's delivering less and it's the machine is not producing as much, the lines are not being used that much, the transformers, your all your switches at the substations. Now you are losing less you are using less. You now have a savings. Would you then pass that saving on to the LRSs? Because we think it's going to |
| 10<br>1                          | save you money, not cost you money.   |
| 2<br> 3<br> 4                    | MR. CARY: I think the basic – the basic assets of any electrical system of fixed costs, and passing, you know, 1 megawatt less down an existing transmission system   |
| 15<br>16                         | MR. LISI: But what if it's 200 megawatts or 500 megawatts?  |
| 17<br>18<br>19<br>20             | MR. CARY: does not does not make any I would think, any difference. Transmission experts here can probably pick this up, but it is certainly no material difference; that is, no perceptible difference here.   |
| 21<br>22<br>23<br>24<br>25<br>26 | MR. CASEY: I would concur that there's no real difference in scalability of 1 or 218 megawatts. Certainly as you use the system if we start to integrate more and more renewable energy on our system, as we've seen up to date, it changes the way we use our system. <sup>68</sup>  |
| 27                               | Both the logic above and the legal interpretation below support confirmation by the   |
| 28<br>29                         | Board of the application of the RtR regime to behind the meter generation.  |
| 80                               | It is NS Power's position that the RtR amendments to the Act apply to a "behind the   |
| 31                               | meter" generator in the context of the sale of renewable low-impact electricity. The  |
| 32                               | Company's interpretation of the legislation is set out in NS Power's Rebuttal Evidence. <sup>69</sup>   |
| 33                               |   |
| 34                               | The term "retail supplier" and the term "retail customer" are defined in subsection 2(1) of   |
| 35                               | the Act as follows:   |
| 36                               |   |

<sup>68</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 157-59, lines 18-22, 1-22 and 1-22.
 <sup>69</sup> Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016, pages 28-31.

| 1<br>2<br>3           | (c) "retail customer" means a person who uses, for the person's own consumption in the Province, electricity that the person did not generate;  |       |
|-----------------------|---|-------|
| 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8 | (d) "retail supplier" means a person who is authorized to sell renewable low-impact electricity in accordance with this Act and the regulations, but does not include a wholesale customer; |       |
| 9                     | Thus, if the generating entity is supplying renewable low-impact electricity to   | its   |
| 10                    | customer for that customer's own consumption in the Province (assuming all o  | ther  |
| 11                    | aspects of the RtR transaction are met) that entity will fall within the definition of "re  |       |
| 12                    | supplier" and the customer will fall within the definition of "retail customer" for   |       |
| 13                    | purposes of the Act. The entity will only be entitled to sell this electricity to its custo   |       |
|                       |   |       |
| 14                    | if it is issued a retail supplier license from the Board in accordance with the Act. U  | •     |
| 15                    | licensing, all the benefits and burdens of the RtR framework, including the RtR tar   | iffs, |
| 16                    | would apply. Sections 3D and 3E of the Act provide as follows:  |       |
| 17                    |   |       |
| 18                    | 3D (1) No person shall act or purport to act as a retail supplier unless the  |       |
| 19                    | person has been issued a retail supplier license pursuant to Section  |       |
| 20<br>21              | 3E.   |       |
| 22                    | (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who is  |       |
| 23                    |   |       |
| 24<br>25              | (a) deemed to be a public utility by the regulations; or  |       |
| 25<br>26              | (b) a member of a class or category of retail suppliers   |       |
| 27                    | prescribed by the regulations.  |       |
| 28                    |   |       |
| 29<br>30              | 3E (1) A person may apply for a retail supplier license in the form and manner prescribed by the regulations.   |       |
| 31                    | manner presented by the regulations.  |       |
| 32                    | (2) Subject to any qualifications prescribed by the regulations, the  |       |
| 33                    | Board may issue a retail supplier license to an applicant, subject to   |       |
| 34<br>35              | any terms and conditions the Board considers appropriate and any terms and conditions prescribed by the regulations.  |       |
| 36                    | terms and conditions preserroed by the regulations.   |       |
| 37                    | Any entity selling or purporting to sell renewable low-impact electricity to a re-  | etail |
| 38                    | customer – whether behind the meter or otherwise – must obtain a license before it can  | ı do  |
| 30                    | so unless it is fits within one of the exceptions in Section 3D(2). To date no entity   | hac   |

| 1                    | been deemed      | a public  | utility under the regulations, nor has any class or category of retail  |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------|---|
| 2                    | suppliers been   | n prescr  | ribed by way of regulation. Indeed, Section 4 of the draft Board  |
| 3                    | Electricity Re   | etailers  | Regulations imposes the same blanket requirement as subsection  |
| 4                    | 3D(1) of the I   | Electrici | ty Act that all retail suppliers be licensed as such:   |
| 5                    | ` ,              |           |   |
| 6<br>7<br>8<br>9     | (4)              | or pur    | ordance with the s. 3D (sic) of the Act, any person who acts ports to act as a Retail Supplier shall hold a valid License by the Board. <sup>70</sup> |
| 10                   | Section 9 of t   | he Boar   | d Electricity Retailers Regulations also provides that a supplier who   |
| 11                   | is issued a lice | ense mu   | st comply with all of the requirements of the RtR framework:  |
| 12                   |                  |           |   |
| 13<br>14<br>15       | (9)              |           | be a term and condition of a Licence that a Licence Holder e subject to and comply with   |
| 16<br>17<br>18       |                  | (a)       | the market rules, tariffs, and procedures approved by the Board;  |
| 19<br>20             |                  | (b)       | the Act, the Renewable Electricity Regulations, and these Regulations;  |
| 21<br>22<br>23<br>24 |                  | (c)       | the Code of Conduct approved by the Board pursuant to s. 27;  |
| 25<br>26             |                  | (d)       | any applicable directives, rules, or orders of the Board; and   |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30 |                  | (e)       | any direction by the Board for payment of any costs reasonably incurred related to hearing complaints or alleged infractions. <sup>71</sup>           |
| 31                   | Port Hawkesh     | oury Pap  | er (PHP) asserts that NS Power's interpretation of the legislation is   |
| 32                   | incorrect and    | points t  | to the fact that the Act defines a retail supplier as a person who is   |
| 33                   | authorized to    | sell ren  | ewable low-impact electricity "in accordance with this Act and the  |
| 34                   | regulations."    | PHP sta   | ates that in its view, "retail suppliers who sell behind the meter to a   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Exhibit N-15, Board Electricity Retailers Regulations (Nova Scotia) enacted under the electricity Act, July 15, 2015, s. 4.
<sup>71</sup> Ibid, s. 9.

single customer do not need to be authorized in accordance with the Act and regulations, since this type of supply is not precluded by the PUA."<sup>72</sup> This argument, however, ignores the fact that such transactions are not currently authorized under any tariff or legislation other than the RtR amendments in the Act and in the absence of such, NS Power would need to determine whether or not it would need to develop a tariff to support it.

Whether or not a sale behind the meter to a single customer is subject to the Public Utilities Act will depend upon a number of factors, including the particulars of the configuration, and would have to be determined on a case by case basis. Assuming, however, that such a sale is not within the ambit of regulation under the Public Utilities Act, Section 3D(1) of the Act states that "a person who acts or purports to act as a Retail Supplier" (i.e. engaged in the sale of renewable low-impact electricity) **must** be licensed. As such, even a person selling to a single customer would require a license regardless of whether it is otherwise encompassed under the Public Utilities Act or not, unless the person is exempted under Section 3D(2). Section 3D(2) expressly releases certain retail suppliers from the requirement for a retail supplier license. This is consistent with the Company's view that the legislation was intended to apply broadly to all such sales of renewable low-impact electricity, while leaving the Province with the discretion to enact regulation to grant relief to such application if it determined that certain suppliers were unintentionally affected.

PHP asserts that NS Power's interpretation would negatively impact the rights of electricity customers. However, there has been no evidence of any existing customers who would be impacted by such a determination. Indeed, when asked on cross-examination about solar panels installed on a customer's home, Mr. Sidebottom confirmed that the Company was not aware of any that were connected synchronously with NS Power's system.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, while the fact that any such transactions will now

<sup>73</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, page 232, lines 18-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Exhibit N-47, Opening Statement of Port Hawkesbury Paper, page 2.

| 1  | be subject to regulation may create additional scrutiny for the supplier, it will serve to  |
|--|---|
| 2  | enhance the rights and protections of those electricity customers.  |
| 3  |   |
| 4  | In the Company's view, CBEX is seeking to take advantage of the benefits of the RtR   |
| 5  | market (i.e. exempt from regulation under the Public Utilities Act) while avoiding the  |
| 6  | obligations to which other LRSs and Retail Customers will be subject (i.e. payment of the   |
| 7  | RtR tariffs) and permitting a cost transfer to remaining customers. In its Opening  |
| 8  | Statement, CBEX stated:   |
| 9  |   |
| 10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17 | IN CLOSING, OUR COMPANY'S POSITION IS THAT THE DRAFT REGULATIONS TABLED BY THE BOARD'S CONSULTANT ARE ACCEPTABLE TO US AND WOULD ENABLE US TO CARRY OUT OUR BUSINESS PLAN PROVIDED THAT:  1) BEHIND THE METER DELIVERY BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY TARIFFS PAYABLE TO NSPI <sup>74</sup>   |
| 18   | Similarly, on questioning from the Chair, Mr. Lisi stated as follows:   |
| 19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23                   | THE CHAIR: So there will be an electrical interchange between your system, whatever it is you're describing with backup, and the Nova Scotia Power system?  |
| 24<br>25<br>26                               | MR. LISI: In some cases, yes, depending on the customer's needs, and in some cases not. In some cases it may be completely separate.  |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30                         | THE CHAIR: Well, I guess what confuses me in the question and I'm just trying to get it straight in my mind you get to the point where you say you don't need any services from Nova Scotia Power, so why are you connected to them?  |
| 31<br>32<br>33<br>34<br>35<br>36<br>37       | MR. LISI: In some cases it will be necessary for customers to maintain that connection to Nova Scotia Power. And if there was a tariff, Mr. Chairman, they recognize that need for that connection, we would think it would be quite feasible for us to pay a certain amount for it. But to think that we would pay exactly the same amount as if we were using all the services that that entail doesn't make any sense. |

<sup>74</sup> Exhibit N-44, Opening Statement of Cape Breton Explorations, page 3.

1 2 3

And also, it's very important for us to understand that if we did not have the transfer switch, that we were completely disconnected, that under the legislation we would not be declared to be delivering a service that is illegal in Nova Scotia. Because at the moment, under the Act, until this Act, only utilities are able to sell electricity. We could install a system and sell the system to a customer, to a private owner, but we could not sell the result of that system. And in our model, we prefer to sell the energy rather than sell the system.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, if the Board ultimately determines that NS Power's interpretation of the Act is not correct and that the RtR framework does not apply to all "behind the meter" scenarios, the Company submits that the Board must assess and determine whether such transactions are still subject to scrutiny under the Public Utilities Act, which applies to sales of electricity "to or for the public." A determination would then have to be made based on the individual circumstances as to whether the behind the meter configuration was in fact precluded by the Public Utilities Act or attracted regulation under that Act. By contrast, a retail supplier, including a behind the meter supplier, who is issued an RtR license under the Act, will be deemed not to be a public utility under Section 3B of the Act. As such, all benefits and burdens of the RtR regime will apply to that retail supplier. To allow otherwise, would produce an unreasonable result and create a cost-transfer to NS Power's bundled service customers as well.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Transcript, January 18, 2016, pages 154-56, lines 11-22, 1-22 and 1-5.

#### 11.0 DEFERRAL OF IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

In order to avoid any cost transfers to NS Power's existing bundled service customers, any direct incremental costs incurred by NS Power in the development and implementation of the RtR market, including the costs of this regulatory proceeding (collectively the RtR Market Implementation Costs) will also have to be recovered through the RtR tariffs. However, NS Power has proposed deferring recovery of those costs until a future date after the RtR market has begun to develop. As noted in the evidence, NS Power intends to amortize the RtR Market Implementation Costs over a reasonable period and include that expense in the future Annually Adjusted Rate processes. At present, the RtR tariffs do not include provision for the recovery of these costs as the amount remains uncertain.

The Company can provide the Board with an updated estimate of the total amount of the RtR Market Implementation Costs as part of its Compliance Filing.

As part of its Order in this proceeding, NS Power respectfully requests the Board include a provision approving the deferral of the Company's recovery of its RtR Market Implementation Costs and permitting NS Power to record the deferred tax effect of the deferral to the Statement of Earnings to align the tax effect of the deferral with the period the deferral is recovered. The recovery of such costs and the tax-effect will be included as part of a future Annually Adjusted Rate process.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> See Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, September 1, 2015, page 30, lines 12-17.

#### 12.0 CONCLUSION

The RtR framework submitted by NS Power reflects many months of extensive stakeholder consultation. The various tariffs and procedures that have been proposed by the Company as well as the amendments to the existing tariffs, regulations and Market Rules are all required by the Act to facilitate the purchase and sale of renewable electricity in the new RtR market. They were developed in accordance with the guiding principles set out in the legislation, namely that NS Power retains the obligation to serve in the event a Retail Customer elects to take service from an LRS or in the event the customer returns to take bundled service from the Company, that existing bundled service customers should not be negatively affected by the market opening and that the LRS and its Retail Customers are to be responsible for all costs related to the provision of RtR service by the LRS to its Retail Customers.

The pace and extent of participation in the RtR market is unknown at this early stage. NS Power understands that improvements may be required to some of the processes over time as the Company gains experience with the RtR market. However, in NS Power's view, the framework proposed will provide the Company and stakeholders with the appropriate amount of flexibility to respond to the market as it develops while still avoiding cost transfer to NS Power's bundled service customers.

Some Intervenors have been critical of the proposed RTT, however such a tariff is required in order to comply with the guiding principles of the Act and avoid customer transfer to NS Power's bundled service customers. SWEB has recommended that the RTT not be approved and that the costs of any resulting stranded assets should be borne by NS Power and its shareholders. This request ignores the requirement under the Act that the costs of the market be borne by the LRS and its customers, as well as the fact that NS Power is entitled under the Public Utilities Act to an opportunity for recovery of, and a return on, its regulated assets.

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| 1  | NS P  | ower requests that the Board approve the Company's Application as filed subject to |
|----|-------|--|
| 2  | the r | evisions recommended by NS Power in the Company's Rebuttal Evidence. <sup>77</sup> |
| 3  | Speci | fically, NS Power requests as follows:   |
| 4  |       |  |
| 5  | (1)   | In response to the SBA's request for a Quarterly Market participation report, the  |
| 6  |       | Board accept the submission of an RtR market report within the annual Wholesale    |
| 7  |       | Market Report with a semi-annual update to the Board on the specific RtR market    |
| 8  |       | activity. The contents of the report and the update shall be as set out in Section |
| 9  |       | 3.4 of the Company's Rebuttal Evidence. <sup>78</sup>                              |
| 10 |       |  |
| 11 | (2)   | In response to the SBA's recommendation with respect to the accounting for EBS     |
| 12 |       | Tariff services, the Board direct NS Power to account for EBS energy (top-up and   |
| 13 |       | spill) separately.   |
| 14 |       |  |
| 15 | (3)   | The Board not adopt the SBA's recommendation that EBS tariff be priced on a        |
| 16 |       | real time basis.   |
| 17 |       |  |
| 18 | (4)   | The Board not adopt the recommendation that NS Power unbundle its bundled          |
| 19 |       | service rates.   |
| 20 |       |  |
| 21 | (5)   | The Board not adopt the CA's recommendation that the distribution and              |
| 22 |       | transmission rates be the same as for bundled service customers and reflect the    |
| 23 |       | R/C ratios in generation charges.  |
| 24 |       |  |
| 25 | (6)   | The Board not adopt the CA's recommendations to "[r]educe the fixed energy         |
| 26 |       | charge to reflect the difference between the embedded energy-allocated costs and   |
| 27 |       | the marginal costs used in setting the spill rates" or to "[i]nstruct NS Power to  |
|    |       |  |

Exhibit N-42, NS Power Rebuttal Evidence, January 8, 2016.

RESPONDED TO THE EXHIBITION OF THE EXHIBIT

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| 1  |      | include all avoidable energy-related costs in its computation of variable                       |
|----|------|---|
| 2  |      | generation costs, further reducing the fixed energy allocated generation charge." <sup>79</sup> |
| 3  |      |   |
| 4  | (7)  | The Board not adopt the CA's recommendation that the RtR rates recognize the                    |
| 5  |      | effect of renewable generator location on line losses for LRS billing.                          |
| 6  |      |   |
| 7  | (8)  | The Board not adopt the CA's recommendation that the Company reconcile the                      |
| 8  |      | RtR language on non-power charges with that in the full service tariffs.                        |
| 9  |      |   |
| 10 | (9)  | The Board not adopt SWEB's recommendation with respect to the removal of the                    |
| 11 |      | RTT.  |
| 12 |      |   |
| 13 | (10) | The revenue requirement in the DT, EBS, SS and RTT tariffs be reduced by the                    |
| 14 |      | amount of the \$30.7 million deferral and the Board adopt Multeese's                            |
| 15 |      | recommendation to apportion this reduction among the generation and                             |
| 16 |      | distribution and retail functional areas on the basis of relative shares of these areas         |
| 17 |      | in the total fixed cost revenue requirement.  |
| 18 |      |   |
| 19 | (11) | The Board not adopt Multeese's recommendation regarding the adjustment to the                   |
| 20 |      | calculation of the top-up and spill rates in the EBS tariff.                                    |
| 21 |      |   |
| 22 | (12) | The Board adopt the following ECI recommendations with respect to amendments                    |
| 23 |      | the LRS T&Cs:   |
| 24 |      |   |
| 25 |      | (a) Section 9.1 of the LRS T&Cs be amended by deleting the word "written".                      |
| 26 |      |   |
| 27 |      | (b) Section 11.5 of the LRS T&Cs be amended to specify a maximum 14 day                         |
| 28 |      | timeframe for NS Power to transfer a customer to Retailer-supply.                               |
| 29 |      |   |

 $^{79}$  Exhibit N-34, Evidence of Resource Insight, Inc. (Chernick), November 20, 2015, page 3, lines 20-25.

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| 1  |      | (c) The Board adopt ECI's recommendation that sections 11.3 and 11.7 of the      |
|----|------|--|
| 2  |      | LRS T&Cs be amended to exclude current charges not yet in arrears.               |
| 3  |      |  |
| 4  |      | (d) The Board adopt ECI's recommendation to remove Section 14.5.5 of the         |
| 5  |      | LRS T&Cs, which requires the form of the LRS' bill to be in a form               |
| 6  |      | acceptable to NS Power.  |
| 7  |      |  |
| 8  | (13) | The Board include a provision in its Order:                                      |
| 9  |      |  |
| 10 |      | (a) Permitting NS Power to include the costs associated with supporting the      |
| 11 |      | RtR market opening, including modifications to its metering and billing          |
| 12 |      | processes and systems and any capital investment that may be required by         |
| 13 |      | the Company, in future Annually Adjusted Rate processes; and                     |
| 14 |      |  |
| 15 |      | (b) Approving NS Power's deferral of its recovery of the Company's RtR           |
| 16 |      | Market Implementation Costs and permitting NS Power to record the                |
| 17 |      | deferred tax effect of the deferral to the Statement of Earnings to align the    |
| 18 |      | tax effect of the deferral with the period the deferral is recovered and to      |
| 19 |      | recover such costs and the tax effect as part of its future Annually             |
| 20 |      | Adjusted Rate process.   |
| 21 |      |  |
| 22 | (14) | The Board's Order provide for the requirement of a final Compliance Filing to be |
| 23 |      | submitted by the Company to the Board, which filing is to include a final set of |
| 24 |      | revised documents, including updated tariff rates to coincide with the date of   |
| 25 |      | implementation for the RtR Market.   |
| 26 |      |  |
| 27 | (15) | The Board's Order not be made effective until a period of six months after the   |
| 28 |      | issuance of its Decision in order to allow for the completion of the Outstanding |

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| 1 | Items as set out in Section 12 of the Company's Application <sup>80</sup> and the status of |
|---|---|
| 2 | such matters be included in the Compliance Filing.  |
| 3 |   |
| 4 | NS Power reserves the right in its Rebuttal to Closing Submissions to respond to matters    |
| 5 | raised in the Closing Submissions of the other Intervenors, including any new items for     |
| 6 | which such parties have not yet put a position before the Board.                            |
| 7 |   |
| 8 | All of which is respectfully submitted.   |

80 See Exhibit N-16, NS Power Application, September 1, 2015, Section 12, pages 77-78.

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